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Abstract In this paper, a copy-move forgery detection method based on Con-
volutional Kernel Network is proposed. Different from methods based on con-
ventional hand-crafted features, Convolutional Kernel Network is a kind of
data-driven local descriptor with the deep convolutional structure. Thanks to
the development of deep learning theories and widely available datasets, the
data-driven methods can achieve competitive performance on different con-
ditions for its excellent discriminative capability. Besides, our Convolutional
Kernel Network is reformulated as a series of matrix computations and con-
volutional operations which are easy to parallelize and accelerate by GPU,
leading to high efficiency. Then, appropriate preprocessing and postprocessing
for Convolutional Kernel Network are adopted to achieve copy-move forgery
detection. Particularly, a segmentation-based keypoints distribution strategy
is proposed and a GPU-based adaptive oversegmentation method is adopted.
Numerous experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and ro-
bustness of the GPU version of Convolutional Kernel Network, and the state-
of-the-art performance of the proposed copy-move forgery detection method
based on Convolutional Kernel Network.
Keywords Copy-move forgery detection · Image forensics · Convolutional
Kernel Network · Keypoints distribution strategy · Adaptive oversegmentation
1 Introduction
With the rapid development of the digital image editing tools, it is easy to
tamper with the digital image even without leaving any perceptible traces.
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By means of duplicating regions to other places in the same image, copy-
move forgery aims at enhancing the visual effect of the image or covering
the truth [19]. The goal of copy-move forgery detection is to determine the
authenticity of the image by detecting the traces left by copy-move forgery.
Copy-move forgery detection is one of the most actively investigated topics in
image forensics [8].
In general, there are two main branches in copy-move forgery detection, one
is block-based forgery detection, and the other is keypoint-based forgery detec-
tion [8]. In the block-based copy-move forgery detection methods, overlapping
image patches which contain raw or transformed pixels are extracted, and
similar patches are sorted to seek traces of forgery [36]. In the keypoint-based
forgery detection methods, features of keypoints, e.g., the Scale-Invariant Fea-
ture Transform (SIFT) [2] and the Speeded-Up Robust Features (SURF) [38],
are adopted to represent the suspicious regions. In fact, the two kinds of
methods both try to describe local features and evaluate the similarity of
different patches. The major difference is that the block-based methods ex-
tract local features from abundant overlapping patches, while keypoint-based
methods only consider patches of keypoints which are mostly located in high
entropy regions. Although great progress has been made in recent researches,
the adopted features for local patches mostly are hand-crafted features. Moti-
vated by the good performance achieved by deep learning methods in computer
vision tasks, we concentrate on the application of data-driven local descrip-
tors in copy-move forgery detection. Convolutional Kernel Network (CKN) is a
kind of data-driven patch-level descriptors which combines kernel methods and
neural networks, achieving good performance and having excellent discrimina-
tive capability [25]. For the purpose of making use of data-driven features in
copy-move forgery detection to improve its performance, we deliberate on the
application and acceleration of CKN in this paper. In section 2, we will make
a comprehensive analysis of the state-of-the-art copy-move forgery detection
methods and data-driven descriptors.
In this paper, CKN is adopted to conduct copy-move forgery detection. In
copy-move forgery detection, one of the important goals for feature representa-
tions is that the features should be invariant to particular transformations. In
CKN, the invariance is encoded by a reproducing kernel which is demonstrated
in the seminal work [25]. Different from conventional CNNs (Convolutional
Neural Networks) which are learned either to represent data or for solving
a classification task [6], CKN learns to approximate the kernel feature map
on training data which is easy to train and robust to overfitting [25]. In [34],
Rao et al. proposed a method to conduct splicing detection and copy-move
forgery detection using so-called local convolutional features, but they initial-
ize the first layer of the network with the basic high-pass filter set and detect
copy-move forgery in the same way as detecting splicing. Those so-called local
features are designed to identify signature inconsistencies in various regions to
locate forged regions, while the adopted data-driven convolutional local fea-
tures in our work aim to find keypoints matches. CKN features can achieve
competitive performance than conventional local features. Numerous experi-
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ments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of the
copy-move forgery detection based on CKN. Although promising results can
be achieved by the proposed method, the original CKN is implemented on
the CPU [24], leading to low efficiency in forgery detection. In this paper, we
reformulate CKN as a series of matrix computations and convolutional opera-
tions, which have enormous advantages to be implemented on GPU. Our GPU
version of CKN can achieve high efficiency without significant compromising
on effectiveness, making it possible to apply CKN to conducting copy-move
forgery detection in batches. The contributions are two-fold:
• Firstly, a kind of data-driven convolutional local feature, i.e. CKN, is
adopted to conduct keypoints matching in copy-move forgery detection.
And CKN is reformulated and reimplemented on GPU to achieve high
efficiency, making it possible to apply in copy-move forgery detection.
• Secondly, appropriate preprocessing and postprocessing methods are adopted
from [19] to achieve copy-move forgery detection based on CKN. Although,
the pipeline is the same as [19], two significant improvements are made to
adjust to CKN: (1) a kind of keypoints distribution strategy based on over-
segmentation is proposed to achieve homogeneous keypoints distribution;
(2) a kind of adaptive oversegmentation method based on CNNs [26], i.e.
COB (Convolutional Oriented Boundaries), is adopted to achieve better
performance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we discuss
related work. In Section 3, we elaborate the proposed method. In Section 4,
experiments are conducted to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of
the proposed method. In Section 5, we draw conclusions.
2 Related Work
The amount of literature relating to copy-move forgery detection or data-
driven descriptors is immense, but the combination of both is rare. In this
section, we will therefore discuss these two directions separately.
Copy-move forgery detection: During the last decades, various meth-
ods have been proposed to detect the copy-move forgery, and those meth-
ods can be broadly divided into two categories, namely block-based methods
and keypoint-based methods. Referring to the workflow of common copy-move
forgery detection methods concluded in [8], with two kinds of methods both
considered, a common framework of copy-move forgery detection can be de-
picted as Fig. 1.
Firstly, the input image is preprocessed, the major preprocessing techniques
include, e.g., the combination of color channels to generate a gray-scale image
that can work properly for a given approach, or segmentation which aims at
reducing the computational complexity and enhancing the detection accuracy,
etc. In [19], the method firstly segments the image into patches by SLIC, and
the keypoints matching is conducted under the restriction of the generated
patches to detect copy-move regions. Similarly, in [33], they proposed a kind of
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Fig. 1 Common framework of the copy-move forgery detection methods.
segmentation method called Adaptive Over-Segmentation algorithm to divide
the host image into non-overlapping and irregular blocks adaptively. Similar
to keypoint-based methods, feature points are extracted from each block to
represent as the block feature.
Secondly, the localization means finding the patch centers, namely over-
lapping blocks of squared sizes or points of interest. Searching all possible
locations and shapes can seldom miss the duplicated regions. However the
computational complexity is almost unacceptable. Meanwhile, false matched
areas are inevitable. On the other hand, conventional interest point detectors
can only detect the points in high contrast regions, and may neglect smooth
areas. In [48], Zandi et al. proposed a novel interest point detector, which takes
use of the advantages of both block-based and keypoint-based methods. By
adopting the new detector, the low contrast regions can be detected.
As for the feature extraction procedure, we introduce it from two parts,
keypoint-based algorithms and block-based algorithms. In keypoint-basedmeth-
ods, two kinds of feature extraction algorithms are commonly adopted, SIFT
and SURF. Although a variety of preprocessing and postprocessing methods
are used, the feature extraction procedures are almost the same. In another
words, the existing keypoint-based methods differ mostly in the kind of inter-
est points taken into consideration and in the matching policy used. In [28,
2,19,33], SIFT is chosen as the feature extraction method. While in [37,38],
SURF is adopted. In [4], the features of triangles are computed and compared
instead of blocks or single points, and the triangles are built onto those key-
points, in which three keypoints detection methods are tested, namely, SIFT,
SURF and Harris.
In block-based methods, many kinds of features have been adopted to
describe the overlapping blocks, e.g., quantized DCT (Discrete Cosine Trans-
form) coefficients adopted in [13], PCA (Principal Component Analysis) in
[32], blur moment invariants with PCA for dimensional reduction in [23],
DWT (Discrete Wavelet Transform) and SVD (Singular Value Decomposition)
[18], Discrete Wavelet Transform or Kernel Principal Component Analysis [5],
Zernike moments [36], FMT (Fourier Mellin Transform) [9], PCT (Polar Co-
sine Transform) [21], LBP (Local Binary Patterns) [20], etc. Although some
features, e.g., DCT, PCA, SVD, etc., are mostly robust against JPEG com-
pression, additive noise and blurring, and some features, e.g., FMT and LBP,
are rotation invariant, those features are not simultaneously robust to scale,
compression and rotation operations.
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In the matching stage, similar patches will be detected. In the newly pro-
posed method in [9], PatchMatch algorithm is adopted to conduct feature
matching with high efficiency, while Zernike Moments (ZM), Polar Cosine
Transform (PCT) and Fourier-Mellin Transform (FMT) are considered for
feature extraction. After the matching stage, it is inevitable that there are
spurious pairs. The filtering stage is designed to remove those spurious pairs.
In [48], a novel filtering algorithm was proposed which can effectively prune the
falsely matched regions, besides their newly proposed interest point detector
as above mentioned.
In the post-processing stage, some simple processes, e.g., morphological
operations, are mostly employed to only preserve matches that exhibit a com-
mon behavior. To refine the results further, some newly proposed methods
update the matching information using the achieved knowledge from the pre-
vious iterations [38,19]. In [11], Ferreira et al. combined different properties
of copy-move detection approaches, and modeled the problem on a multiscale
behavior knowledge space, which encodes the output combinations of different
techniques as the priori probabilities considering multiple scales of the training
data.
Although various methods were proposed recently, leading to tremendous
progress in copy-move forgery detection, few work has been conducted on
the optimization of feature extraction. In the state-of-the-art methods, con-
ventional hand-crafted descriptors (e.g., LBP, ZM, PCT, FMT, SIFT, SURF,
etc.[8,11]) are widely adopted. Motivated by the great advance of deep learning
methods in computer vision tasks [17,35,15], we adopt a kind of data-driven
local convolutional feature, namely CKN, to conduct copy-move forgery de-
tection.
Data-driven descriptors: The algorithms adopted in copy-move forgery
detection are mainly borrowed from the computer vision tasks, such as image
classification [47], object detection [10] and image retrieval [42], etc. Recent
advances in computer vision tasks have been greatly promoted by the quick
development of the GPU technologies and the success of convolutional neural
networks (CNN) [17]. Different from conventional formulations of image clas-
sification based on local descriptors and VLAD [16] etc., the newly proposed
image classification methods based on CNN adopt an end-to-end structure.
Deep networks naturally integrate low/mid/high level features [49] and clas-
sifiers in an end-to-end multilayer fashion, and the levels of features can be
enriched by the number of stacked layers (depth). Typical convolutional neural
networks, e.g., AlexNet [17], VGG [41], ResNet [14,15], and ResNeXt [44] etc.,
have greatly improved the performance on the tasks of image classification and
object detection [35], etc. Features output by above-mentioned CNNs’ inter-
mediate layers can be regarded as image-level descriptors or so-called global
features. Those global features are designed to reinforce inter class difference
while neglect the intra class difference. And those deep learning based meth-
ods proposed for computer vision tasks can not directly be used in copy-move
forgery detection which aims to find similar regions undergoing rotation, re-
sizing or deformation.
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Inspired by the expressive feature representations output by image-level
CNNs, the question of whether suitable patch-level descriptors could be de-
rived from such architectures has been raised [29], which aims at substitut-
ing data-driven descriptors for hand-crafted patch-level descriptors. Recently,
several deep local descriptors were proposed and can achieve promising per-
formance on patch matching and patch classification [12,40,25,24]. In [12],
a patch and patches generated by conducting different transformations on it
are regarded as the same class, and the network is trained on those surrogate
class labels. In [40], a siamese architecture of CNN is adopted and trained
on matching/non-matching pairs. In [25], the authors proposed a reproduc-
ing kernel which produces multi-layer image representation and trained the
network without supervision which is called Convolutional Kernel Network
(CKN). They bridge the gap between kernel methods and neural networks
and aim at reaching the best of both worlds. In [24], a supervised version of
CKN was proposed and trained in an end-to-end manner. CKN has been tested
on numerous datasets and also been adopted to conduct image retrieval in [30,
29], achieving competitive results with the state-of-the-arts. For its remark-
able discriminative capability and invariance properties, we introduce CKN
for copy-move forgery detection.
3 Method
The pipeline of the proposed copy-move forgery detection method originates
from the work proposed by Li et al. [19], the framework of the proposed method
is shown in Fig. 2. As introduced in Section 1, three significant changes are
made: data-driven local descriptors (i.e. CKN), the segmentation-based key-
points distribution strategy and adaptive GPU-based oversegmentation (i.e.
COB). Thus, this section is organized as follows: Firstly, we introduce the the-
oretic derivation of Convolutional Kernel Network; Secondly, we introduce the
computation procedure of the CKN-grad and analysis its feasibility of imple-
menting on GPU; Finally, we make an introduction on how to conduct forgery
detection making use of CKN features, with the explanation of the proposed
segmentation-based keypoints distribution strategy and the adopted adaptive
GPU-based oversegmentation.
Adaptive 
Oversegmentation 
by COB
 Keypoints detection based on 
segmentation-based keypoints 
distribution strategy
+
CKN feature extraction
+
Patch matching
+
Transform estimation
First Stage of Matching
Obtaining new correspondences
+
Obtaining new transform 
matrix
+
Repeat the above two steps
Second Stage of Matching
Fig. 2 The framework of the proposed copy-move forgery detection method based on CKN.
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3.1 Convolutional Kernel Network
Fig. 3 The two-layer convolutional kernel architecture.
Convolutional Kernel Network (CKN) is designed to output patch descrip-
tors, and the input patches can be generated by keypoint detectors (e.g. DoG
[2]). Let M and M′ denote two patches of size m×m, and Ω = {1, · · · ,m}2 is
the pixel locations set. pz denotes the sub-patch from M centered at location
z ∈ Ω with a fixed sub-patch size (resp. p′z′ denotes the sub-patch fromM′). In
the implementation, the sub-patches near the border of M which have values
outside of Ω are discarded without padding. The convolutional kernel between
M and M′ is defined as:
K1(M,M
′) =
∑
z,z′∈Ω
||pz||||p′z′ ||e
−
||z−z′||2
2β1
2 e
−
||p˜z−p˜
′
z′
||2
2α1
2 (1)
where β1 and α1 denote smoothing parameters of Gaussian kernels, ||·|| denotes
L2 norm, and p˜z := (1/||pz||)pz which is the L2-normalized version of the sub-
patch pz, and p˜
′
z′ is the L2 version of p
′
z′ . Thus, the feature representation
of a patch is defined by the convolutional kernel. For that the kernel is a
match kernel, a tunable level of invariance can be offered through the choice
of hyperparameters, producing hierarchical convolutional representations [25].
To compute formula (1), the approximation procedure can be denoted as:
K1(M,M
′) ≈
∑
u∈Ω1
g1(u;M)
T g1(u;M
′) (2)
g1(u;M) :=
∑
z∈Ω
e
−
||u−z||2
2β1
2 h1(z;M), u ∈ Ω1 (3)
h1(z;M) := ||pz||[√ηje−
||wj−p˜z||
2
α1
2 ]n1j=1, z ∈ Ω (4)
where Ω1 is the subset of Ω, wj and ηj are the learned parameters. There are
two distinct approximations: 1) one is in the subsampling defined by |Ω1| ≤ |Ω|
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that corresponds to the stride of the pooling operation in CNN; 2) the other
is in the embedding of the Gaussian kernel of the subpatches:
||pz||||p′z′ ||e
−
||p˜z−p˜
′
z′
||2
2α1
2 ≈ h1(z;M)Th1(z′;M′) (5)
Since K1(M,M
′) is the sum of the match-kernel terms, sampling n pairs
of sub-patches {(pi, p′i)}i=1,··· ,n, it can be approximated at sub-patch level by
solving an optimization problem as follows:
minwj ,ηj
n∑
i=1

e− ||p˜i−p˜′i||2α12 − n1∑
j=1
ηje
−
||wj−p˜i||
2
α1
2 e
−
||wj−p˜
′
i
||2
α1
2


2
(6)
To get potentially better feature representation, the kernel can be overlaid
by another kernel. In the single layer kernel, an approximation spatial map
f1(M) is computed, where M denotes an input patch. Thus, a kernel K2
can be defined in the same way as K1. The two-layer convolutional kernel
architecture is shown in Fig. 3. For the ingenious design of CKN, it is difficult
to draw out the theoretical roots in such a short piece, readers can kindly refer
to [25,24] for the introduction of training procedures and detailed proofs. Of
course, it is easy to understand the full procedure of forgery detection based
on CKN, keeping in mind that CKN generates feature descriptors for patches.
3.2 CKN-grad Computation
Fig. 4 The computation procedure of CKN-grad.
In this paper, a two-layer structure CKN called CKN-grad is adopted, in
which the input is the gradient along each spatial dimension (the input multi-
channel image is transformed to one channel to compute the gradient). The
size of the input patch is 51× 51 (which means m = 51 in Ω), and the size of
the sub-patch is set as 1×1. The input at location z is pz = (Gzx , Gzy ), where
Gzx and Gzy are the gradients along axis x and axis y respectively. Because
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the input features are normalized, the inner part of the match kernel ||p˜z− p˜′z′ ||
is directly linked to the cosine of the angle between the two gradients, see [25].
So the approximation of kernel K1 is computed as:
e
−
||p˜z−p˜
′
z′
||2
2α1
2 ≈
n1∑
j=1
ϕ1(j; pz)ϕ1(j; p
′
z′) (7)
ϕ1(j; pz) = exp
(
− (cosθj −Gzx/ρ)
2 + (sinθj −Gzy/ρ)2
α12
)
(8)
where
ρ =
√
G2zx +G
2
zy
(9)
α1 =
√(
1− cos
(
2pi
n1
))2
+ sin
(
2pi
n1
)2
(10)
and θj = 2jpi/n1, j ∈ {1, · · · , n1} (we set n1 = 16). Thus, given the input map
M, the input map before the convolution of Gaussian weights and pooling can
be computed as:
h1(M) =
(
(ρ · ϕ1(j; pz))n1j=1
)
z∈Ω
(11)
the output map f(M) of the first layer is computed as:
f(M) = (conv (Kg(γ1), h1(M)))zˆ∈Ω1 (12)
where conv(·) denotes the convolutional operation, Kg(γ1) denotes the Gaus-
sian kernel with a factor γ1 (we set γ1 = 3), Ω1 is obtained by subsampling Ω
with the stride of γ1. With the factor γ1, Lk1 = 2× γ1 + 1, the size of Kg(γ1)
is Lk1 × Lk1 , and Kg(γ1) is computed as:
Kg(γ1) =
(
kg(k1, k2, γ1)∑
k1
∑
k2
kg(k1, k2, γ1)
)
Lk1×Lk1
(13)
where kg(k1, k2, γ1) = exp(−(k12 + k22)/2(γ1/
√
2)2), k1, k2 are the relative
coordinates to the center of the kernel Kg(γ1). Thus, the output map of the
first layer is a tensor of the size of (m/γ1)× (m/γ1)× n1 = 17× 17× 16.
In the second layer, the input map is f(M), the size of the sub-patch py
is mpy × mpy = 4 × 4, subsampling factor is set as γ2 = 2 and n2 = 1024.
Omitting the borders, the number of input sub-patches is (m/γ1−mpy +1)×
(m/γ1−mpy +1)×n1 = 14× 14× 16. So the input of the second layer can be
transformed to a matrixM2 of size 256×196. By conducting the approximation
procedure introduced in 3.1, the parameters Wi = (wj)
n2
j=1 and ηi = (ηj)
n2
j=1
are learned, i = 1, · · · , N (N = 256). Trying to formulate it as the matrix
computation, the parameters are transformed to a weight matrix W1024×256
and bias B1024, the elements are computed as:
wj =
2wj
α22
(14)
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bj =
log(ηj)
2
− 1 + ||wj ||
2
α22
(15)
To reduce parameters, we set bj =
∑N
i=1 bi/N . Thus, we can get a 1024-
dimensional vector B1024. B1024×196 is a matrix with each column equal to
B1024. Finally, the output map is computed as:
h2(M2) = W1024×256 ×M2 +B1024×196 (16)
So the size of the output map is 1024× 196. With the subsampling factor set
as γ2 = 2, the size of the final output map is 512× 98 after linear pooling with
Gaussian weights. The computation procedure of linear pooling with Gaussian
weights is the same as formula (12). Thus, the total dimension of the feature
vector extracted by CKN-grad is 50176. Then PCA (Principle component anal-
ysis) is adopted for dimensionality reduction. The hyperparameters and the
PCA matrix both are obtained by training on the RomePatches dataset [29].
Finally, a 1024-dimensional feature vector can be extracted by CKN-grad from
a patch of size 51× 51.
Fig. 5 GPU acceleration of linear pooling with Gaussian weights.
As shown in Fig. 4, the diagram of the CKN-grad structure and com-
putation procedure is given. It can be clearly seen that the computation of
CKN-grad is the process of numerous matrix computations in fact. Thus, it
can be implemented on GPU directly which will be more efficient. Besides,
in the procedure of linear pooling with Gaussian weights, a kind of acceler-
ation method is adopted to conduct convolution, as shown in Fig. 5. In the
first layer, a tensor of size 51× 51× 16 is input to conduct linear pooling with
Gaussian weights. There are two steps in this procedure: 1) convolutional com-
putation with Gaussian weights, 2) pooling. In the original codes provided by
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the seminal work [25], 16 matrixes of 51×51 are convolved separately along 16
loops which are time consuming. We propose to use an acceleration procedure
without loop. With the subsampling factor set as γ1 = 3, the tensor needs to
be convolved with a kernel of Lk1×Lk1 = 7×7. Conventionally, it is equivalent
to the combination of row convolution and column convolution. To reduce the
communication between the CPU and GPU, the tensor is transformed to a
matrix of size (16× 1)× (51× 51) (see Fig. 5) which is transferred into GPU
altogether. On GPU, each block of size 51 × 51 is convolved separately and
parallelly by the row vector and column vector. Then, a pooling operation is
conducted parallelly on the map after row convolution and column convolu-
tion. In the second layer, the input matrix is firstly transformed to a tensor
of size 14 × 14 × 1024. Then the same computation is conducted. As shown
in Fig. 5, it is the computation process of the linear pooling with Gaussian
weights on GPU.
3.3 Forgery Detection
As shown in Fig. 2, the suspicious image firstly is segmented into an abun-
dant number of regions, i.e. oversegmentation. In the original work proposed
by Li et al. [19], the SLIC (Simple Linear Iterative Clustering) algorithm [1]
is adopted to conduct oversegmentation, and SLIC is a popular superpixel
segmentation method which has been widely used in saliency detection [7],
semantic segmentation [27] and many other computer vision tasks. The SLIC
algorithm adapts a k-means clustering approach to efficiently generate the
superpixels, and it adheres to the boundaries very well. However, the initial
size of the superpixels in SLIC is decided empirically, and of course difficult
to decide [22]. In another work of copy-move forgery detection [33], they also
employed the SLIC segmentation method for image blocking, and proposed a
method to determine the initial size of the superpixels adaptively based on the
texture of the host image.
In this paper, we adopt another kind of segmentation method, namely,
COB (Convolutional Oriented Boundaries) [26] which can produce multiscale
oriented contours and region hierarchies. COB requires a single CNN forward
pass for contour detection and uses a novel sparse boundary representation
for hierarchical segmentation, giving a significant leap in efficiency and per-
formance. In fact, COB and its precursor, i.e. MCG [31] all originate from
gPb-owt-ucm [3]. Though gPb-owt-ucm can achieve excellent performance on
accuracy, it is excluded in the original work of Li et al. [19] for its complexity
and inefficiency. In [19], they adopt SLIC, and set the region size empirically
as Table II in [19]. With the help of recent developed CNN features and HED
edge detection[45], COB is much more efficient (demonstrated as Table 2 in
[26]) and accurate (demonstrated as Fig. 8 in [26]) than gPb-owt-ucm, MCG
and many other segmentation methods. COB can generate superpixels auto-
matically and adaptively based on the detected edges. So, in the first step
of oversegmentation in our method, we make use of COB. As shown in Fig.
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6, we simply replace the segmentation method in [19], and it can be clearly
seen that accurate and adaptive segmentation is even helpful to achieve more
accurate detection or avoid missing detection. Besides, COB can also be used
as a kind of object proposal method which can generate a set of segmentations
which may contain entire objects. As discussed in [19], the image should be
segmented into small patches, each of which is semantically independent to
the others. The multiscale oriented contours and region hierarchies of COB
may be helpful to solve this problem, and we leave it for future work.
Fig. 6 The comparison between copy-move forgery detection based on SLIC and COB.
After image segmentation, the first stage of matching is conducted, and
the first step is keypoints detection. In the original work [19], they employed
DoG (difference of Gaussian) with a fixed threshold (0.004 in their implemen-
tation). In [46], Yang et al. defined the keypoints uniformity measurement
(KUM) value, which denotes the keypoints distribution level. With iterations
of keypoints detection, they get an appropriate threshold for DoG which the
KUM value of the detected keypoints is lower than a fixed value (0.3 in [46]).
In this paper, motivated by the homogeneous distribution of superpixels, we
propose a kind of segmentation-based keypoints distribution strategy. In our
method, DoG keypoint detection is firstly conducted with a very low thresh-
old (we set the lowest value 0). And let L denotes the label matrix generated
by COB, Li denotes the superpixel i, n denotes the number of superpixels,
K denotes the detected keypoints, m denotes the number of keypoints, and
S denotes the corresponding scores of keypoints which can be generated by
DoG. Thus, the pseudocode of the proposed segmentation-based keypoints dis-
tribution strategy can be formulated as Algorithm 1. As shown in Algorithm
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1, according the size proportion of each superpixel, we compute the standard
number of keypoints of each superpixel. If the number of detected keypoints
is less than the standard number in the superpixel, we output the detected
keypoints in this superpixel directly. Otherwise, we sort the keypoints accord-
ing to their scores, and output a standard number of keypoints. Meanwhile,
to avoid missing those ”good” keypoints, we also output the keypoints which
have larger scores than a threshold score (we set as the median of scores, i.e.,
λ = 0.5).
Algorithm 1: Segmentation-based keypoints distribution strategy
Input: L = {Li|i = 1, 2, · · ·n}, K = {kj |j = 1, 2, · · ·m} and S = {sj |j = 1, 2, · · ·m}
1: threshold score = sround(λ×m)
2: Ko = { }
3: for i = 1 to n do
4: standard keypoint numi = m× size(Li)/size(L)
5: Ki = {kt in Li|t = 1, 2, · · ·mi}
6: Si = {st corresponding to kt|t = 1, 2, · · ·mi}
7: if mi <= standard keypoint numi then
8: Ko = Ko ∪Ki
9: else
10: Sort Ki according to Si:
Ksi = {k
s
t |t = 1, 2, · · ·mi}
Ssi = {s
s
t corresponding to k
s
t |t = 1, 2, · · ·mi}
11: Ko = Ko ∪ {kst |t = 1, · · · standard keypoint numi}
12: for t = standard keypoint numi + 1 to mi do
13: if sst > threshold score then
14: Ko = Ko ∪ {kst }
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
Output: Ko
Once the keypoints Ko are detected, the CKN features can be extracted
from those detected keypoints as introduced in Section 3.2. Then the rest steps
are the same as the original work proposed in [19], which can be concluded
as following steps: (1) the detection of the suspicious pairs of regions which
contain many similar keypoints. Specifically, in each region, for each keypoint,
we search its K nearest neighbors that are located in the other regions, with
constructing a k-d tree to decrease the complexity of searching K nearest
neighbors. (2) After the step (1), suspicious pairs of regions are detected, then
we estimate the relationship between these two regions in terms of a transform
matrix by conducting RANSAC method. (3) For the reason of that a limited
number of keypoints cannot resist the possible errors in keypoint extraction,
a so-called second stage of matching is conducted to eliminate false alarm
regions. As shown in Fig. 2, this stage consists of two steps, namely obtaining
new correspondences and obtaining new transform matrix. The estimation
of the transform matrix is refined via an EM-based algorithm. Due to space
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limitations, we can not explain the theoretical derivation of these steps in
detail, readers can kindly refer to the original work [19] for help.
4 Experiments
In this paper, the contributions are two-fold: the data-driven convolutional lo-
cal descriptor adoption, and the appropriate formulation of CKN-based copy-
move forgery detection to achieve the state-of-the-art performance, which have
been discussed in Section 1. Thus, we conduct the experiments from two as-
pects: CKN evaluation (Section 4.1) and comparison with other methods (Sec-
tion 4.2). In Section 4.1, we try to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness
of our GPU-based CKN; In Section 4.2, we try to demonstrate that the pro-
posed method can achieve the state-of-the-art performance, and it is robust
to different kinds of attacks.
4.1 CKN Evaluation
As introduced in Section 3.2, the CKN is reformulated as a series of matrix
computations and convolutional operations. To demonstrate the effectiveness
and robustness of our GPU version of CKN, experiments are conducted from
two parts: (1) the comparison between CKN and the GPU version of CKN by
conducting patch retrieval to demonstrate its efficiency; (2) the performance
of CKN in the field of copy-move forgery detection. In this part, we adopt
the conventional framework of copy-move forgery detection based on SIFT [2]
for fair comparison. In another word, we simply replace the feature extrac-
tion method in [2] to make a fair comparison between SIFT and CKN. In
this formulation, suspicious areas are detected based on feature matching and
hierarchical clustering without further preprocessing or postprocessing. Thus,
the effectiveness and robustness of extracted features can be demonstrated.
As discussed in Section 3.1, the goal of the CKN optimization is to approx-
imate the kernel feature map on the training data, and the training process
is totally the same as the original work of CKN for image retrieval [29], in
which the network is trained on the train split of RomePatches based on the
SGD optimization. Readers can kindly refer to [29] for the detailed introduc-
tion of training procedures. The training process of CKN is not the concern of
this work, and the contribution for CKN in this work is the GPU-based for-
mulation and acceleration, as introduced in Section 3.2. The training sets of
RomePatches are totally different from the test images for copy-move forgery
detection evaluation. In another word, the parameters of CKN learned from
RomePatches can be applied to different conditions which will be demon-
strated in the following experiments.
The CKN codes provided by the seminal work [24] are implemented based
on CPU , which results in low efficiency, as shown in Table 1. The low efficiency
seriously prevents the application of CKN. Especially, in the domain of copy-
move forgery detection, thousands of patches are detected in a single image,
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Table 1 Results for patch retrieval
Algorithm Machine
RomePatches train RomePatches test
running
time(s)
accuracy(%)
running
time(s)
accuracy(%)
CKN-grad
(1)
99.74 92.06 101.73 86.98
CKN-grad-GPU 12.79 91.51 12.77 86.42
CKN-grad
(2)
244.47 92.06 244.98 86.98
CKN-grad-GPU 15.22 91.51 15.31 86.42
Table 2 Copy-move forgery detection results on MICC-F220 dataset
Algorithm metric TN TP FN FP TPR FPR
SIFT-origin ward 100 108 2 10 98.18% 9.09%
SIFT-origin single 104 99 11 6 90.00% 5.45%
SIFT-origin centroid 101 108 2 9 98.18% 8.18%
SIFT-VLFeat ward 97 110 0 13 100.00% 11.82%
SIFT-VLFeat single 104 101 9 6 91.82% 5.45%
SIFT-VLFeat centroid 98 110 0 12 100.00% 10.91%
CKN-grad ward 101 110 0 9 100.00% 8.18%
CKN-grad single 103 96 14 7 87.27% 6.36%
CKN-grad centroid 102 109 1 8 99.09% 7.27%
CKN-grad-GPU ward 101 110 0 9 100.00% 8.18%
CKN-grad-GPU single 103 96 14 7 87.27% 6.36%
CKN-grad-GPU centroid 102 109 1 8 99.09% 7.27%
which need further feature extraction. Thus, we reformulate CKN making it
possible to implement based on GPU and accelerate the feature extraction.
To demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency of our GPU version of CKN,
experiments are conducted on the RomePatches dataset [29]. The train set
and the test set of RomePatches dataset both contain 10000 patches, and the
total feature extraction time of CKN-grad (CPU version) and CKN-grad-GPU
is recorded. For comprehensive comparisons, we conduct the experiments on
two machines: Machine (1) with Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5930KCPU @ 3.50GHz,
64GB RAM and a single GPU (TITAN X); Machine (2) with Intel(R) Xeon(R)
CPU E5-2640 v2 @ 2.00GHz, 64GB RAM and a single GPU (Tesla M40).
Clearly, our GPU version of CKN, i.e. CKN-grad-GPU, is more efficient. The
speed of CKN-grad-GPU is at least 8 times of that of CKN-grad on CPU
(16 times on machine (2)), with only a little compromising on the accuracy of
patch retrieval, which will be shown that there is no difference between CKN-
grad and CKN-grad-GPU to conduct copy-move forgery detection in the next
experiments.
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness and robustness of CKN and the
GPU version of CKN, elaborate experiments are conducted on two publicly
available datasets: MICC-F220 and MICC-F2000. There are 220 images in
MICC-F220, in which 110 images are original and 110 images are tampered.
In MICC-F2000, there are 2000 images with 1300 original images and 700
tampered images. The detection performance is measured by the true positive
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rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR). Specifically, TPR=TP/(TP+FN)
and FPR=FP/(FP+TN), where TP denotes true positive which means images
detected as forged being forged, FN denotes false negative which means images
detected as original being forged, FP denotes false positive which is the number
of images detected as forged being original, and TN denotes true negative
which is the number of original images detected as original.
First of all, experiments are conducted with Th and min cluster pts (which
denotes the least number of pairs of matched points linking a cluster to another
one) fixed. Ward, single, and centroid are three kinds of linkage metrics used
to stop cluster grouping with the threshold (Th), readers can refer to [2] for
details. Four kinds of methods are tested, namely, SIFT-origin, SIFT-VLFeat,
CKN-grad and CKN-grad-GPU. The results of SIFT-origin are generated by
the codes provided by the seminal work [2], the patch size of SIFT-origin is
16× 16. For fair comparison, in SIFT-VLFeat, we extract SIFT features from
patches of size 51× 51. In SIFT-VLFeat, CKN-grad and CKN-grad-GPU, we
adopt the codes provided by VLFeat to conduct patch extraction.
It can be seen from Table 2 that CKN-grad and CKN-grad-GPU can gen-
erate the same results without any difference, which means that there is no
significant compromising of effectiveness by reformulating CKN on GPU, while
the GPU version is more efficient. For this reason, a comprehensive comparison
is conducted in the next part among SIFT-origin, SIFT-VLFeat and CKN-
grad-GPU (we consider that CKN-grad and CKN-grad-GPU are the same).
In general, SIFT-VLFeat and CKN-grad-GPU can constantly achieve better
performance than SIFT-origin. For the reason of that the performance of SIFT
can be influenced by the patch size [39]. Besides, the number of patches gen-
erated by VLFeat is not the same as the original codes [2], though they both
adopt DoG algorithms. SIFT-VLFeat and CKN-grad-GPU can achieve similar
TPRs, while CKN-grad-GPU can achieve lower FPRs.
In Table 2, the Th is set fixedly the same as the default parameter of
provided codes while the linkage metric is varied. In this part, for each linkage
method, we report the TPR and the FPR with respect to Th, which varies in
the interval [1.6, 2.8] with steps of 0.2. In general, CKN-grad-GPU can achieve
better performance than SIFT-origin on both MICC-F220 and MICC-F2000,
as shown in Fig. 7. Though the TPRs of CKN-grad-GPU with the metric as
single are lower while the Th is between [2.0, 2.8], CKN-grad-GPU achieves
the best performance while the Th is set as 1.6 and 1.8. On MICC-2000, CKN-
grad-GPU constantly achieves higher TPRs, but the FPRs become higher. As
for the comparison between SIFT-VLFeat and CKN-grad-GPU, they achieve
similar TPRs, while CKN-grad-GPU achieves lower FPRs for most, as shown
in Fig. 8. It can be demonstrated that the discriminative capability of CKN-
grad-GPU is better.
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Fig. 7 The comparison between SIFT-origin and CKN-grad-GPU on MICC-F220 (top row)
and MICC-F2000 (bottom row) for different linkage metrics and Th (axis x).
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Fig. 8 The comparison between SIFT-VLFeat and CKN-grad-GPU on MICC-F220 (top
row) and MICC-F2000 (bottom row) for different linkage metrics and Th (axis x).
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Table 3 The performance of each step on CoMoFoD dataset with no postprocessing.
Algorithm
Images with F1-
measure > 0.5
Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
Li et al. [19] 102 0.5446 0.8504 0.5954
[19] with COB 100 0.5690 0.8156 0.6133
[19] with SKPD 99 0.5390 0.8327 0.5838
[19] with COB+SKPD 91 0.5662 0.8040 0.6055
[19] with COB+CKN 90 0.5536 0.8193 0.6054
Ours 97 0.5927 0.8220 0.6318
4.2 Comparison with other methods
In this section, the proposed method is compared with two state-of-the-art
copy-move forgery detection methods, the one is proposed by Li et al. [19] and
the other is proposed by Silva et al. [38]. The comparisons are made on the
publicly available dataset named CoMoFoD [43]. CoMoFoD consists of 200
tampered examples with the size of 512 × 512. Images are forged by copy-
ing a part of an original image and pasting it on a different location in the
same image. Five types of transformations are applied, namely translation,
rotation, scaling, distortion and combination. Each type of transformation
contains 40 examples. Besides the version with no postprocessing, the images
are processed under 6 kinds of postprocessing respectively, namely JPEG com-
pression, noise adding, image blurring, brightness change, color reduction, and
contrast adjustments. Thus, we conduct 7 separate experiments, as shown in
Table 4-10. On the dataset without postprocessing, we also conduct experi-
ments to demonstrate the necessity and feasibility of each step, as shown in
Table 3. The results of Li et al. [19] and Silva et al. [38] are generated by the
codes provided by the authors. Because the CoMoFod dataset provides the
pixel-level groundtruth for each tampered image, we compute the pixel level
precision, recall and F1-measure for each detected result as follows:
precision =
|{CMF pixels} ∩ {retrieved pixels}|
|{retrieved pixels}| (17)
recall =
|{CMF pixels} ∩ {retrieved pixels}|
|{CMF pixels}| (18)
F1 = 2× precision× recall
precision+ recall
(19)
where CMF pixels denotes the labeled tampered pixels in the ground truth,
and retrieved pixels denotes the detected tampered pixels. The precision cal-
culates the ratio of the retrieved CMF pixels in all the retrieved pixels, and the
recall calculates the ratio of the retrieved CMF pixels in all of the CMF pix-
els. For each generated binary tamper map, we computes its precision, recall
and F1-measure, and then for different kinds of transformations, we computes
their average precisions, recalls and F1-measures.
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In Table 3, comparisons are conducted with different settings. We set the
work of Li et al. [19] as the baseline which can achieve the state-of-the-art
performance. While we simply replace the segmentation method as COB, both
the precision and F1-measure increase. However, if we simply adopt the SKPD
(segmentation-based keypoint distribution), all the scores decrease. If we adopt
COB and SKPD simultaneously, the scores are lower than the version with
COB. It seems like that SKPD is useless. However, we find that if we adopt the
pipeline of [19] with COB+CKN, the performance is even worse. Dramatically,
with the help of SKPD (the full pipeline shown in Fig. 2), our method can
achieve good performance with the highest precision and F1-measure scores.
The main reason is that SKPD provides more redundant keypoints and the
discriminative capability of SIFT is not good enough, so the false alarmed
areas are too much. While CKN is so cautious that many tampered areas are
miss-detected. The redundant keypoints of SKPD can provide more candidates
for CKN, and the combination of both can achieve better performance.
The comparisons with other methods on the images without further post-
processing are shown in Table 4. It can be seen that for different kinds trans-
formations, the proposed method can get higher average precisions than Li et
al. [19], while the F1-measures are higher except for scaling transformation.
Of course, Silva et al. [38] can achieve excellent performance in some ways,
e.g., the best performance for translation. In general, the proposed method
can achieve better performance than the original work of Li et al. [19] and
Silva et al. [38] on CoMoFoD dataset with no postprocessing.
Then we test the robustness of the proposed method under different at-
tacks, namely, JPEG compression, noise adding, image blurring, brightness
change, color reduction, and contrast adjustments. As shown in Table 4-10,
for most cases, the proposed method can get higher precisions and competitive
F1 scores, and the proposed method is quite robust to different attacks. As for
noise adding and brightness change, the number of images with F1-measure
> 0.5 decreases while the images are forged with scaling and combination
transformation. In the tampered images with combination transformations,
there are 27 images (total 40 images) have been under scaling transformation.
Thus, the proposed method still needs to reinforce its scale invariant property.
Overall, the proposed method can achieve competitive performance than the
state-of-the-art methods, and is robust to different kinds of attacks.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a copy-move forgery detection method based on Con-
volutional Kernel Network, and reformulate Convolutional Kernel Network
based on GPU. The main contributions can be concluded as follows: CKN
adoption in copy-move forgery detection and GPU-based CKN reformulation,
segmentation-based keypoints distribution strategy and GPU-based adaptive
oversegmentation. Extensive experiments are conducted to show that the pro-
posed method based on Convolutional Kernel Network can achieve competitive
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Table 4 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with no postprocessing.
Algorithm
Transformation
(number of images)
Images with F1-
measure > 0.5
Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
Li et al.
[19]
Translation (40) 17 0.4180 0.8327 0.4798
Rotation(40) 19 0.5594 0.8281 0.5978
Scaling(40) 20 0.5542 0.8492 0.6059
Distortion(40) 26 0.6425 0.9045 0.6961
Combination(40) 20 0.5448 0.8306 0.5919
Silva et al.
[38]
Translation (40) 20 0.4921 0.7754 0.5493
Rotation(40) 17 0.5532 0.7451 0.5573
Scaling(40) 14 0.4966 0.6971 0.5008
Distortion(40) 18 0.5814 0.7878 0.5650
Combination(40) 19 0.5885 0.6934 0.5475
Ours
Translation (40) 16 0.4547 0.8023 0.5246
Rotation(40) 24 0.6833 0.9006 0.7174
Scaling(40) 16 0.5696 0.7516 0.5864
Distortion(40) 25 0.6631 0.8516 0.6987
Combination(40) 16 0.5599 0.7825 0.5997
Table 5 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with JPEG compression
(quality factor = 90).
Algorithm
Transformation
(number of images)
Images with F1-
measure > 0.5
Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
Li et al.
[19]
Translation (40) 13 0.3835 0.8473 0.4502
Rotation(40) 16 0.5809 0.8817 0.6285
Scaling(40) 20 0.5630 0.8448 0.6037
Distortion(40) 22 0.6490 0.8860 0.6902
Combination(40) 18 0.5528 0.8816 0.5879
Silva et al.
[38]
Translation (40) 7 0.3789 0.4122 0.3113
Rotation(40) 4 0.3990 0.3779 0.2708
Scaling(40) 4 0.4858 0.3567 0.3000
Distortion(40) 7 0.5625 0.3825 0.3571
Combination(40) 9 0.5355 0.4170 0.3447
Ours
Translation (40) 12 0.4052 0.7260 0.4658
Rotation(40) 16 0.5977 0.8014 0.6369
Scaling(40) 15 0.5169 0.7248 0.5449
Distortion(40) 22 0.5963 0.7787 0.6175
Combination(40) 13 0.5162 0.7260 0.5138
performance than conventional hand-crafted features and the state-of-the-art
methods. By bridging a gap between copy-move forgery detection and data-
driven local convolutional features, we believe that we are opening a fruitful
research direction for the future.
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Table 6 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with Noise adding (vari-
ance = 0.0005).
Algorithm
Transformation
(number of images)
Images with F1-
measure > 0.5
Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
Li et al.
[19]
Translation (40) 13 0.4636 0.7563 0.5211
Rotation(40) 16 0.6202 0.8399 0.6528
Scaling(40) 18 0.5673 0.7438 0.5849
Distortion(40) 20 0.6806 0.7821 0.7013
Combination(40) 16 0.5466 0.7411 0.5575
Silva et al.
[38]
Translation (40) 5 0.4035 0.4550 0.3170
Rotation(40) 8 0.5924 0.6481 0.5265
Scaling(40) 9 0.6159 0.5115 0.4987
Distortion(40) 14 0.6828 0.5627 0.5270
Combination(40) 10 0.5998 0.4912 0.4681
Ours
Translation (40) 14 0.5097 0.7819 0.5623
Rotation(40) 15 0.6385 0.8076 0.6578
Scaling(40) 9 0.5838 0.6840 0.5677
Distortion(40) 19 0.7380 0.8411 0.7627
Combination(40) 10 0.5842 0.7705 0.6086
Table 7 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with image blurring
(averaging filter = 3× 3).
Algorithm
Transformation
(number of images)
Images with F1-
measure > 0.5
Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
Li et al.
[19]
Translation (40) 13 0.3186 0.9206 0.4067
Rotation(40) 18 0.4481 0.8753 0.5280
Scaling(40) 18 0.4514 0.9096 0.5304
Distortion(40) 24 0.5022 0.9449 0.5953
Combination(40) 18 0.4139 0.9008 0.4961
Silva et al.
[38]
Translation (40) 19 0.4842 0.7653 0.5356
Rotation(40) 17 0.5183 0.7043 0.5335
Scaling(40) 17 0.5281 0.6994 0.5212
Distortion(40) 22 0.6243 0.8292 0.6048
Combination(40) 19 0.5383 0.6873 0.5281
Ours
Translation (40) 14 0.3481 0.8270 0.4318
Rotation(40) 22 0.5114 0.8591 0.5945
Scaling(40) 18 0.4890 0.7836 0.5540
Distortion(40) 29 0.5715 0.8949 0.6611
Combination(40) 21 0.4849 0.8448 0.5575
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Table 8 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with brightness change
((lower bound, upper bound) = (0.01, 0.8)).
Algorithm
Transformation
(number of images)
Images with F1-
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Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
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Table 9 Copy-move forgery detection results on CoMoFoD dataset with color reduction
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Algorithm
Transformation
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Average
precision
Average
recall
Average
F1-measure
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